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 Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-1991: Regional Dynamic and the Su-
 perpowers. By Bassam Tibi. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp. 253.
 $39.95.)
 Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf Edited by Hooshang-
 Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar. (London: Routledge, 1992. Pp. 306. $59.95
 cloth.)
 The two books under review here take substantially different approaches to Mid-
 dle East politics. 'the first book attempts to examine the region by use of theory as
 well as empirics, whereas the second is primarily empirical in nature. The latter
 explains Middle East politics primarily from the regional perspective, and in par-
 ticular, from Iran's vantage point, whereas the former places regional politics
 within the broader context of world politics.
 Bassam Tibi uses systems "theory" in order to examine the interplay between
 regional dynamics and great power interests during the Middle East wars of 1967,
 1973, and 1990-1991. In Tibi's view, world politics is composed of separate ideas
 or subsystems such as the Middle East, which are suitable units of analysis. These
 areas, which are delimited based on their structural interconnectedness and the
 degree of intensity of cooperation between actors (36), exhibit a degree of au-
 tonomy and a degree of integration in the global system.
 Tibi deserves praise for attempting to study the Middle East from a theoretical
 perspective. The dearth of theory-oriented work on the region is unfortunate.
 Tibi's ability to draw on diverse literatures and on international relations writ
 large is also impressive and adds much to the book as does his effort to place
 Middle East war and conflict in historical context.
 At the same time, the book has weaknesses. First, systems theory, which should
 be distinguished from Kenneth Waltz's systemic theory of neorealism, is much less
 a theory than an approach. By most standards, a theory is an internally consistent
 set of empirical generalizations which allow for some level of prediction. Systems
 "theory," particularly as it is applied in this book, does not generate predictions of
 anykind.
 Tibi devotes two lengthy chapters to the systems approach. Yet, the approach is
 applied loosely and it is not fully clear that his empirical insights derive from it.
 The reader is left wondering at times what the systems approach reveals which
 otherwise would be elusive.
 Second, his primary and secondary themes, while well-founded, are not partic-
 ularly remarkable. Tibi argues that Middle East conflicts have their "own regional
 dynamic, while at the same time being incorporated into the global state system"
 (1). He laments what he perceives as a propensity to view these conflicts from the
 global perspective without giving due attention to key regional factors. For in-
 stance, he observes that few students disentangled the Arab-Israeli conflict from
 the competition prevailing between the superpowers and implies that many schol-
 ars saw superpower competition as the cause of regional war (3, 15). Yet, while he
 reminds us of the importance of regional dynamics, his point here is not altogether
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 lost on scholars. At a minimum, a stronger case should have been made that schol-
 ars have neglected the regional perspective.
 The secondary theme of the book is that, contrary to expectations, great powers
 have difficulty controlling weaker states. This theme certainly has merit, but it
 also has a rather extensive pedigree in the international relations and Middle East
 literature. Tibi would have done well to present his theme in that tradition.
 In empirical terms, Tibi does put Middle East conflict in both a regional and
 global context which is useful, albeit dated in certain sections. However, he tends
 at certain points to exaggerate the level of regional interconnectedness. For in-
 stance, he observes that the fact remains that the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis is "part
 and parcel of the overall regional structure of conflicts in the Middle East" (178).
 One wonders what this means in practical terms, particularly given the fact that
 the etiology of the Gulf conflict, as the author himself observes, had little to do
 with other regional conflicts. Tibi observes that the "link between armed conflict
 in the Gulf and the other Middle Eastern conflicts begins with the fact that all
 Middle Eastern boundaries were drawn along colonial lines." Yet, while this might
 be common to regional conflicts, it does not explain how they relate causally. And
 it is precisely this point that the reader seeks to understand not only because the
 author introduces it in his empirical account but also because it is relevant to his
 own systems approach.
 In contrast to Tibi's work, the edited volume by Hooshang Amirahmadi and
 Nader Entessar takes a nontheoretical approach to Middle East politics. It focuses
 on the themes of Islam and revolution, economic destruction and reconstruction
 of Iran's economy, Iranian-Arab relations, and the superpowers and Iran. The
 editors put together an interesting, well-grouped, and informative set of essays
 by Keddie, Linabury, Norton, Amirahmadi, Ehteshami, Ahrari, Entessar, Milani,
 and Mesbahi.
 As a whole, the book effectively presents Iran's view of and position in regional
 and international politics. This is useful. For instance, we do not often think of
 Saudi Arabia as threatening Iran, but Entessar points out why Iran is legitimately
 concerned about the Saudi military buildup (218-19). Inasmuch as this is ac-
 curate, it has significant implications for Arab and American regional policy to-
 ward Iran.
 However, the book also often mirrors Iran's view on regional security with-
 out doing enough to convince the reader of its merits. Amirahmadi and Entessar
 make the point that regional security arrangements need to be made to obviate
 future outside military intervention which invariably will lead to disastrous con-
 sequences (4). But why is this so? While it is clear that, all other things being
 equal, nonintervention is preferable to intervention, it is not a maxim that in-
 terventions produce disastrous consequences. Would the region have been better
 off had Iraq's aggression in Kuwait not been checked by the U.S.-led alliance?
 Iran itself, which condemns outside intervention, greatly benefited from U.S.-led
 action.
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 In any event, if outside intervention is counterproductive, then what might a re-
 gional security arrangement look like? Entessar argues that Iran should be inte-
 grated into Gulf security arrangements which so far have been based on American
 cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of Saudi Arabia,
 Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain (221). But this raises
 the critical questions of whether Iran (which has been viewed as part of the re-
 gional security problem) can now become part of its solution, and how it might be
 integrated. The book could do more to answer these key questions. In particular,
 the reader needs to be more convinced that pragmatists in Iran are in a substan-
 tially stronger position than "radicals," and that Iran's relations with regional
 states and with the United States are strong enough to make Iran's inclusion in a
 regional security framework sensible.
 The book does rightly point to the improvement in Iran's relations with regional
 states from 1989 to 1991 (144), and to Iran's increasing pragmatism (chap. 2), but
 this makes Iran's August 1992 annexation of the strategic island of Abu Musa all
 the more perplexing. Abu Musa had been jointly administered by Iran and the
 United Arab Emirates (UAE) under an agreement concluded in 1971, until Iran
 annexed it and took control of two neighboring islands, the Greater and Lesser
 Tunbs. This act cast some doubt on Iran's role in regional security.
 The chapters by Keddie, Linabury, and Norton do a good job of explaining the
 impact of Iran's revolution. Keddie asks why Iran has been so revolutionary in his-
 tory, and applies an interesting, implicit comparative approach to answer this ques-
 tion. But the reader seeks to know more about which causes of revolution are
 most important and how they interact to produce revolution. Linabury examines
 Khomeini's legacy and impact regionally, whereas Norton explores the link be-
 tween the Iranian revolution and the Lebanese Shi'a community. These two chap-
 ters, which take a macro- and micro-level approach respectively, are complemen-
 tary and highly useful, particularly given the growing importance of Islamic fun-
 damentalism.
 Amirahmadi's two chapters on Iranian economic destruction and reconstruc-
 tion offer an informative, competent overview of the impact of the Iran-Iraq war
 on Iran's economy and of Iran's attempt to revive its war-torn economy. However,
 more analysis of the interplay between economics and Iran's foreign policy is
 needed. For instance, Amirahmadi observes that Iran is advocating economic co-
 operation over balance-of-power politics (137). If accurate, this point has serious
 implications for American and Arab policy toward Iran, and thus deserves more
 attention.
 Ehteshami's chapter 6 traverses familiar ground, but does offer a sense of the
 evolution of Iranian politics toward increased pragmatism. Ahrari's chapter 7 as-
 sesses the role of the GCC in Gulf security, whereas Entessar proposes a frame-
 work for regional stability. These chapters, however, were written prior to Iran's
 annexation of Abu Musa, which as noted earlier, casts some doubt on Iran's re-
 gional intentions.
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 The concluding chapters by Milani and Mesbahi examine Iran's relations with
 the superpowers. Mesbahi observes that American and Soviet misunderstanding
 of the religious component of the Iranian revolution undermined their for-
 eign policy toward Iran, and Milani asserts that America displayed an "institu-
 tional inability to adjust quickly to revolutionary change in the third world" (256).
 Both points are probably true, but one wonders whether a more intelligent
 American policy toward Iran could have prevented the clash between America and
 Iran. If not, then the problem lies not only with the United States but elsewhere
 as well.
 Steve Yetiv, Harvard University
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